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Purdue University
Janne V. Kujala
University of Jyva¨skyla¨
Dramatis personæ:
Expositor, trying to present and clarify the main points of a certain view of
contextuality.
Interlocutor, skeptical but constructive.
Authors, supportive of Expositor but sympathetic to Interlocutor (remain
off-stage except for occasionally inserting footnotes).
Conversation 1
Expositor: My dear Interlocutor, as we have agreed, we will discuss a certain
approach to probabilistic contextuality. Its authors call it, perhaps not too
descriptively, the Contextuality-by-Default theory (CbD).1 I think I should
begin by giving you an informal overview of the main ideas.
Interlocutor: My dear Expositor, I always find an informal presentation of
ideas a dubious exercise. If I do not understand the presentation clearly
(which happens often), it is never clear to me whether this is because it was
dumbed down so much as to become deficient of information, or because the
ideas themselves are deficient. Nevertheless I should let you proceed.
Exp: Let me try. Objects (or things, or properties — choose what you like) are
measured under varying conditions, called contexts. The measurements are
generally random variables, and their identity is defined by what is measured
(object) and under what conditions it is measured (context). As a result,
the same object measured in different contexts is represented by different
random variables: it is meaningless to ask why they are different (hence the
designation “contextuality-by-default”). Moreover, measurements made in
different contexts, whether of the same object or of different objects, do not
1Aut: The term indeed may not have been optimally chosen. It may suggest that all
systems of measurements are contextual until proven otherwise. This is not true. The “by-
default” in the name of the theory refers to the identification of the measurements as random
variables: their identity always (“by default”) depends on context.
1
have a joint distribution. One cannot, e.g., speak of their correlation or of
the probability with which they have the same value. All measurements
made within one and the same context, however, are jointly distributed.
The overall picture we have therefore is one of stochastically unrelated to
each other islands of jointly distributed measurements (“bunches of random
variables”). Is this sufficiently clear?
Int: I am not sure. How does one define “objects” and “contexts”?
Exp: Primitives of a theory cannot be explained conceptually except in their re-
lations to other primitives of the theory, and their operational meaning may
be outside the theory. The “objects” and “contexts” are such primitives:
formally, they are no more than labels defining the identity of a measure-
ment (so that each measurement is defined by two labels, one for “what”
and another for “in what context”).
Int: Perhaps we could clarify this with examples.
Exp: Here is an example. Suppose we pose two Yes/No questions to randomly
chosen people and record their responses. The questions can be asked ver-
bally or presented in writing. Intuitively, a question asked is the “object” be-
ing measured, the presentation mode (verbal or written) is context, and the
response to a given question by a randomly chosen person is measurement,
a random variable labeled by the question asked and by its presentation
mode.
Int: So we have four random variables, if I understood you correctly: response
to question A presented verbally, response to question A presented in writ-
ing, and analogously for the second question, B.
Exp: Yes. Let me suggest notation for these four random variables:
RVA , R
W
A , R
V
B , R
W
B ,
or, better still, (
RVA , R
V
B
)
,
(
RWA , R
W
B
)
.
R stands for response (whose values can be Yes or No), the subscript shows
the object (question), and the superscript shows the context (presentation
mode). We record RVA and R
V
B together because the two questions are posed
to a same person. For the same reason, RWA and R
W
B are recorded together.
Therefore
(
RVA , R
V
B
)
are jointly distributed, and so are
(
RWA , R
W
B
)
. This
accords with the general rule: random variables recorded in the same context
are jointly distributed. Now, we assume that a person is asked either two
written questions or two verbal questions. So, RVA is never recorded together
with (which means here, never obtained from the same person as) RWA or
RWB . Therefore such pairs as R
V
A , R
W
A or R
V
A , R
W
B have no joint distribution.
Int: What does this mean exactly, not to have a joint distribution?
Exp: It is clear that for each of our four variables we have well-defined prob-
abilities with which their value is Yes: this is the probability with which a
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randomly chosen person will respond Yes to the corresponding question in
the corresponding context. Say, the probability of the event
[
RVA = Yes
]
is
0.4, the probability of
[
RVB = Yes
]
is 0.5, and for
[
RWB = Yes
]
the probabil-
ity is, say, 0.7. All these probabilities are well-defined theoretically and can
be estimated empirically. Since we ask A and B in the verbal mode together
(from a same person), we can also define and estimate the joint probability
of
[
RVA = Yes and R
V
B = Yes
]
. For instance, if it equals 0.4 × 0.5, then the
two random variables are independent; if it equals 0.4, they are maximally
positively correlated, etc.
Int: I see. And, I understand, the situation is different with RVA , R
W
B or
RVB , R
W
B , because there is no meaning in which one could define “and” in,
say,
[
RVB = Yes and R
W
B = Yes
]
.
Exp: Precisely. The probability of this conjunction is undefined and cannot
be estimated empirically. So the general rule is: no two random variables
recorded in different (mutually exclusive) contexts possess a joint distri-
bution. Let’s agree to call such variables stochastically unrelated (to each
other).
Int: What if I modified the design of the survey, and asked only one question
per person, in writing or verbally? Wouldn’t then even RVA and R
V
B be
stochastically unrelated? And wouldn’t this contradict our general rules?
Exp: No combinations of objects and contexts can contradict our general rules
because these combinations have to be chosen in accordance with these rules.
In your modified set-up, if we continue to view the questions A and B as
our sole and distinct objects, then the contexts involve not only the mode
of presentation but also the identity of the questions themselves: (A, V ),
(B,W ), etc. So the random variables we record are
R
(A,V )
A , R
(A,W )
A , R
(B,V )
B , R
(B,W )
B .
Since no two of them share a context, they are pairwise stochastically unre-
lated.
Int: But how do I know which of the representations to use, RVA or R
(A,V )
A ?
Exp: First you have to decide (outside the CbD theory) on the empirical mean-
ing of “co-occurrence” or “occurrence together” in your study. In our exam-
ples you consider questions posed to one and the same person (and responses
obtained from one and the same person) as co-occurring. You also know the
rules, so you always use different contexts, whatever your choice of the labels
for them, for the measurements that do not co-occur. Suppose I simplify
your design by forgetting about the presentation modes. I ask one of two
questions, A or B, of randomly chosen people. The objects being measured
then are A and B again, and we know that the measurements of these ob-
jects never co-occur, hence they are stochastically unrelated. Therefore the
questions themselves (or any two labels corresponding to them one-to-one)
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are the contexts here,
RAA, R
B
B.
Int: I think I now understand the notion of stochastic unrelatedness and your
notation. But couldn’t we also say in all such cases that the two random
variables, e.g., RAA, R
B
B , are stochastically independent?
Exp: This would be a common way of thinking of this situation. But it is
incorrect. One could only say, with some caution, that they can always
be treated as if they were independent. We will get to this later, when
we consider the notion of a coupling. You can, however, appreciate the
difference between the situation when a randomly chosen person is being
asked one of two questions, A or B, and the situation when a randomly
chosen person is being asked both these questions, A and B. The two
responses in the latter case are random variables(
R
(A,B)
A , R
(A,B)
B
)
,
jointly distributed: one can define and estimate the probability of the joint
event
[
R
(A,B)
A = Yes and R
(A,B)
B = Yes
]
. Suppose we find out that this
probability equals the product of the probability of
[
R
(A,B)
A = Yes
]
and the
probability of
[
R
(A,B)
B = Yes
]
taken separately. Then we say that the ran-
dom variables R
(A,B)
A and R
(A,B)
B are stochastically independent. This is
fundamentally different from the situation with RAA and R
B
B , when the joint
event
[
RAA = Yes and R
B
B = Yes
]
is simply undefined.2
Int: I see the difference. I still have questions about the objects and contexts,
but I think I should allow you to continue your presentation of CbD. The
double-notation, I understand, is only a departure point.
Exp: Yes, it is. And we will indeed continue to address your misgivings as
we proceed. By now we have established a certain picture of a system of
measurements: it consists of stochastically unrelated to each other islands
(or bunches) of jointly distributed random variables. The main idea of CbD
is that these isolated bunches can be characterized by exploring all possi-
ble couplings thereof ( or all possible joint distributions imposable on them)
under well-chosen constraints.
Int: What is a coupling?
Exp: A coupling for stochastically unrelated random variables X,Y, . . . , Z is
a jointly distributed
(
X˜, Y˜ , . . . , Z˜
)
in which X˜ has the same distribution
as X , Y˜ has the same distribution as Y , and so on.3 For instance, in our
2Aut: For a detailed discussion, see Dzhafarov and Kujala (2014c) and Dzhafarov (2015).
3Aut: See Thorisson (2000). A traditional definition of a coupling does not require that
the random variables being coupled be stochastically unrelated, but in the present context it
is the only application.
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example with RAA and R
B
B , let the distributions of these random variables
be defined by (with Pr standing for probability)
Pr
[
RAA = Yes
]
= 0.4,Pr
[
RBB = Yes
]
= 0.7.
The measurementsRAA and R
B
B are stochastically unrelated, so Pr
[
RAA = Yes and R
B
B = Yes
]
is undefined. To couple them means to create a new pair of random vari-
ables, R˜AA and R˜
B
B , that are distributional copies of, respectively, R
A
A and
RBB but are jointly distributed. That is,
Pr
[
R˜AA = Yes
]
= 0.4,Pr
[
R˜BB = Yes
]
= 0.7,
but, unlike the “originals” RAA and R
B
B , their distributional copies have a
well-defined joint probability,
Pr
[
R˜AA = Yes and R˜
B
B = Yes
]
.
It can be shown that this probability can have any value from 0.1 (maximally
negative relation) to 0.4 (maximally positive relation). The independent
coupling, with this probability equal to 0.4× 0.7, is within this range.
Int: And any of these values will define a pair
(
R˜AA, R˜
B
B
)
that is a coupling for
RAA and R
B
B?
Exp: Yes. The number of all possible couplings for a given pair of random
variables is typically infinite. For binary X,Y (say, Yes/No ones) the only
exceptions are the pairs with Pr [X = Yes] or Pr [Y = Yes] having the values
0 or 1. For such a pair only one coupling is possible.
Int: Let me try an example with continuous distributions. Take random vari-
ables R and S that are standard normally distributed. Then any bivariate
normally distributed
(
R˜, S˜
)
with standard normal marginals is a coupling
of R and S.
Exp: Yes, and there are other couplings for these R and S too: it can be
any
(
R˜, S˜
)
whose joint distribution is well-defined, and whose individual
(marginal) distributions are standard normal.
Int: Just so that we don’t focus on pairs of random variables exclusively, what
would be a coupling for the four random variables RVA , R
W
A , R
V
B , R
W
B in our
original example? There we had two pairs (you called them “bunches”) with
jointly distributed components,
(
RVA , R
V
B
)
and
(
RWA , R
W
B
)
.
Exp: Because of the latter, this example too can be presented as involving just
pairs:
(
RVA , R
V
B
)
is a random variable too, unless we use the term very nar-
rowly. But this is not critical: it is the same thing to seek a coupling for(
RVA , R
V
B
)
and
(
RWA , R
W
B
)
, each with a known distribution, and to seek a cou-
pling for RVA , R
W
A , R
V
B , R
W
B in which you know the distributions of
(
RVA , R
V
B
)
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and
(
RWA , R
W
B
)
. The joint distribution of
(
RVA , R
V
B
)
is determined by four
probabilities
(
RVA , R
V
B
)
: (Yes,Yes) (Yes,No) (No,Yes) (No,No)
probability : pY Y pY N pNY pNN
,
with the probabilities summing to 1, of course. And the joint distribution
of
(
RWA , R
W
B
)
is determined analogously,
(
RWA , R
W
B
)
: (Yes,Yes) (Yes,No) (No,Yes) (No,No)
probability : qY Y qY N qNY qNN
.
To couple these pairs (equivalently, to couple all four random variables
RVA , R
W
A , R
V
B , R
W
B ) means to create a quadruple
(
R˜VA , R˜
W
A , R˜
V
B , R˜
W
B
)
with
jointly distributed components such that the distributions of the pairs
(
R˜VA , R˜
V
B
)
and
(
R˜WA , R˜
W
B
)
are the same as those of
(
RVA , R
V
B
)
and
(
RWA , R
W
B
)
, respec-
tively. For instance,
Pr
[
R˜VA = Yes and R˜
V
B = No
]
= pY N , Pr
[
R˜WA = No and R˜
W
B = No
]
= qNN , etc.
Int: And to create a quadruple
(
R˜VA , R˜
W
A , R˜
V
B , R˜
W
B
)
with jointly distributed
components means ...
Exp: It means to assign to each of the 16 possible quadruples of values a
probability value:
(R˜VA , R˜
W
A , R˜
V
B , R˜
W
B ) : (Yes,Yes,Yes,Yes) (Yes,Yes,Yes,No) . . . (No,No,No,No)
probability : rY Y Y Y rY Y Y N . . . rNNNN
.
To form a coupling, these probabilities should agree with the observed p and q
values: e.g.,
∑
i,j∈{Yes,No}
rY iNj = pY N ,
∑
i,j∈{Yes,No}
riNjN = qNN .
Int: And, of course, this can generally be done in an infinite number of ways.
I think it is clear. You said earlier that you wanted to characterize the
isolated bunches of random variables by exploring all possible couplings of
these bunches under well-chosen constraints. Tell me now what you mean
by the “well-chosen constraints” for couplings.
Exp: The “well-chosen constraints” depend on (and determine) the aspect of
the system of unrelated to each other bunches you want to characterize. If we
are interested in contextuality, the idea (arguably, the most original idea in
the CbD approach) is to look for couplings in which the measurements of one
and the same object under different conditions are equal to each other with
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as high a probability as possible. Contextuality is determined by computing
these highest probabilities for each object in isolation and then determining
if they are compatible with the observed bunches of measurements.
Int: I assume you want to elaborate.
Exp: I will. But I think we will relegate this to our next conversation.
Conversation 2
Exp: My dear Interlocutor, you asked me to elaborate what I said about the
measurements of an object in different contexts being equal to each other
with as high a probability as possible. First of all, let me emphasize that the
probability of being equal to each other applies to the couplings rather than
the coupled random variables themselves. When I find a bivariate-normally
distributed coupling
(
R˜, S˜
)
for standard normally distributed R and S, I
do not make R and S jointly distributed, I merely create jointly distributed
“copies” of R and S. And there are generally an infinite set of such cou-
plings. Among them there is one coupling, with the correlation between
R˜ and S˜ equal to 1 (defining a degenerate bivariate-normal distribution),
in which Pr
[
R˜ = S˜
]
has the highest possible value (in this case, 1). It is
called a maximal coupling. If R and S are normally distributed but with
different means and/or variances, then the maximal couplings still exist, but
not among bivariate normally distributed
(
R˜, S˜
)
, and the highest possible
probability for
[
R˜ = S˜
]
is less than 1.
Int: Let me switch back to our original example to understand this. In
RVA , R
W
A , R
V
B , R
W
B we have R
V
A and R
W
A measuring the same object A in
two contexts. We take them and look for a coupling
(
R̂VA , R̂
W
A
)
for them,
forgetting for the time being all about the remaining two variables. We
ask the question: what is the maximal possible probability for the event[
R̂VA = R̂
W
A
]
? We know that, by definition of a coupling,
Pr
[
R̂VA = 1
]
= Pr
[
RVA = 1
]
= pVA ,
Pr
[
R̂WA = 1
]
= Pr
[
RWA = 1
]
= pWA .
I assume this allows me to compute the maximal possible value for Pr
[
R̂VA = R̂
W
A
]
?
Exp: Yes. This maximal value is 1−
∣∣pVA − pWA ∣∣. It is very easy to prove.4
4Aut: See, e.g., Dzhafarov et al. (2015a).
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Int: I will take you word for it. So we have
max
all couplings
(R̂VA ,R̂WA )
Pr
[
R̂VA = R̂
W
A
]
= 1−
∣∣pVA − pWA ∣∣ .
After that I forget all about RVA and R
W
A and focus on R
V
B and R
W
B , the
other two measurements of one and the same object in two contexts. By
analogy,
max
all couplings
(R̂VB ,R̂WB )
Pr
[
R̂VB = R̂
W
B
]
= 1−
∣∣pVB − pWB ∣∣ .
How does one proceed from here?
Exp: Now we have to take all four our random variables and construct a cou-
pling
(
R˜VA , R˜
W
A , R˜
V
B , R˜
W
B
)
for them. We have already discussed how we do
this. Except in special cases, there is an infinity of such couplings. What we
are now interested in is whether among all these couplings there is at least
one in which
Pr
[
R˜VA = R˜
W
A
]
= 1−
∣∣pVA − pWA ∣∣
and
Pr
[
R˜VB = R˜
W
B
]
= 1−
∣∣pVB − pWB ∣∣ .
If the answer to this question is affirmative, then we say that the system
of measurements, in this case comprised of
(
RVA , R
V
B
)
and
(
RWA , R
W
B
)
, is
noncontextual. If there is no such couplings, then the system is contextual.
Int: Let me first see how this works if
pVA = p
W
A and p
V
B = p
W
B .
The maximal probabilities of
[
R̂VA = R̂
W
A
]
and of
[
R̂VB = R̂
W
B
]
then are equal
to 1, for both A and B. So, if I can find a coupling
(
R˜VA , R˜
W
A , R˜
V
B , R˜
W
B
)
in
which R˜VA is always the same as R˜
W
A and R˜
V
B is always the same as R˜
W
B ,
then the system is noncontextual.
Exp: This is in fact the traditional understanding of contextuality (expressed
in the language of CbD).5 If R˜VA and R˜
W
A are always the same, one can say
that the measurement of A does not depend on what the context is, V or
W ; and analogously for R˜VB and R˜
W
B .
Int: The adjective “noncontextual” here seems intuitive to me. Let me now con-
sider the case when pVA 6= p
W
A , i.e., the maximal probability 1−
∣∣pVA − pWA ∣∣ <
1. So we begin by computing ... But wait: the measurements of A here have
different distributions in context V and in contextW , so these measurement
5Aut: See Dzhafarov and Kujala (2014a,c).
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are context-dependent. Why don’t we declare this system of measurements
contextual, without computing anything else?
Exp: You are touching on a subtle conceptual and terminological issue. Nothing
prevents one from calling this system contextual, but in the terminology of
CbD it is called inconsistently connected (and if pVA = p
W
A and p
V
B = p
W
B , the
system is consistently connected). If you insist on using the word “contextu-
ality” whenever a system has pVA 6= p
W
A or p
V
B 6= p
W
B , call this “contextuality-
1.” Or use another qualifier, but distinguish this form of contextuality from
the contextuality in the sense of CbD (call it “contextuality-2” if you like).
It is the form of contextuality that may exist on top of the “contextuality-1.”
Int: I still have misgivings, but we can return to this later. Let me resume
my attempt to understand how this “contextuality-2” works in the case
pVA 6= p
W
A and/or p
V
B 6= p
W
B . We compute the maximal probability of[
R̂VA = R̂
W
A
]
across all couplings
(
R̂VA , R̂
W
A
)
for RVA and R
W
A ; and, sepa-
rately, we compute the maximal probability of
[
R̂VB = R̂
W
B
]
across all cou-
plings
(
R̂VB , R̂
W
B
)
for RVB and R
W
B . These probabilities, you tell me, are
1 −
∣∣pVA − pWA ∣∣ and 1 − ∣∣pVB − pWB ∣∣, respectively. Then we look at all pos-
sible couplings
(
R˜VA , R˜
W
A , R˜
V
B , R˜
W
B
)
for all four of our random variables,
and for each of them we compute the probabilities of
[
R˜VA = R˜
V
B
]
and of[
R˜WA = R˜
W
B
]
.
Exp: It is clear that these probabilities cannot exceed the values 1−
∣∣pVA − pWA ∣∣
and 1−
∣∣pVB − pWB ∣∣, respectively — because every sub-coupling
(
R˜VA , R˜
W
A
)
of(
R˜VA , R˜
W
A , R˜
V
B , R˜
W
B
)
is also one of the possible couplings
(
R̂VA , R̂
W
A
)
for RVA
and RWA taken separately; and analogously for
(
R˜VB , R˜
W
B
)
and
(
R̂VB , R̂
W
B
)
.
Int: Yes, I see this. Now, if in some of the couplings
(
R˜VA , R˜
W
A , R˜
V
B , R˜
W
B
)
both
these probabilities are achieved, then we say the system is noncontextual
(lacks “contextuality-2”). Otherwise it is contextual.
Exp: Yes. The intuition here is that there is something in the relationship
between
(
RVA , R
V
B
)
and
(
RWA , R
W
B
)
that cannot be reduced to the separate
effects of the context changes on the responses to A and on the responses to
B.
Int: Wait, wait. Couldn’t we then simply reformulate the problem by taking
(A,B) as a single object? Then we would have two stochastically unrelated
random variables
RV(A,B), R
W
(A,B),
each with four possible values, (Yes-Yes), (Yes-No), etc. We will have contex-
tuality if their distributions are different. This would be “contextuality-1,”
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of course.
Exp: This is definitely a possible approach. I have mentioned already that ob-
jects and contexts are primitives of the CbD theory, which means that the
theory does not dictate their choice. The only constraint imposed by the
theory is that the random variables measured in the same context have a
joint distribution, while random variables in different contexts do not. If you
choose a single object in two contexts, as you have proposed, you will simply
be dealing with a different problem. The system comprised of RV(A,B) and
RW(A,B) may or may not be inconsistently connected (I suggest we stick to this
term instead of “contextuality-1” and the like), but irrespective of this, it is
noncontextual. If it is inconsistently connected, then the system we consid-
ered previously,
(
RVA , R
V
B
)
and
(
RWA , R
W
B
)
, may or may not be consistently
connected, and in either case it can be contextual or noncontextual.
Int: Then I was wrong: inconsistent connectedness in
{
RV(A,B), R
W
(A,B)
}
does
not predict or account for the contextuality in
{(
RVA , R
V
B
)
,
(
RWA , R
W
B
)}
.
Exp: No, it does not. The system
{(
RVA , R
V
B
)
,
(
RWA , R
W
B
)}
can be shown to be
noncontextual if and only if
∣∣〈RVARVB〉− 〈RWA RWB 〉∣∣ ≤ ∣∣〈RVA〉− 〈RWA 〉∣∣+ ∣∣〈RVB〉− 〈RWB 〉∣∣ ,
where 〈·〉 is expected value.6 You can easily verify that this inequality may
hold or fail with the distributions of RV(A,B) and R
W
(A,B) being different.
Int: I wonder: even if we get a completely different system by doing this, is it
always possible to get rid of contextuality in the sense of CbD by redefining
the objects?
Exp: The answer to this is yes, but generally not by grouping the objects
together, as in RV(A,B), R
W
(A,B). Consider, e.g., a system involving three ob-
jects q, q′, q′′ and three contexts c, c′, c′′, combined in the measurements as
follows:7 (
Rcq, R
c
q′
)
,
(
Rc
′
q′ , R
c′
q′′
)
,
(
Rc
′′
q′′ , R
c′′
q
)
.
As always, the pairs of random variables labeled by the same context are
jointly distributed, and different pairs are stochastically unrelated. One
cannot now put all three objects together as a single object. Instead one
can do something universally applicable: taking a measurement’s context
as part of the identity of the measurement’s object. In our case this means
replacing q in Rcq with (q, c), replacing q in R
c′′
q with (q, c
′′), etc. We will
get then in place of the system above a new system
(
Rc(q,c), R
c
(q′,c)
)
,
(
Rc
′
(q′,c′), R
c′
(q′′,c′)
)
,
(
Rc
′′
(q′′,c′′), R
c′′
(q,c′′)
)
.
6Aut: This is an example of a cyclic system with n = 2, as defined in Conversation 3.
7Aut: This is an example of a cyclic system with n = 3.
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In this system no two measurements share their object, and the system
is readily seen as trivially noncontextual (and also consistently connected,
again in the trivial sense).
Int: This universal trick then consists in declaring any object in a new context
to be a new object. For instance, a question presented verbally and the same
(in content) question presented in writing are different questions.
Exp: Yes, and there is nothing incorrect about this, at least not from the point
of view of CbD. It just makes the issue of contextuality uninteresting.
Int: So we will not use this trick for the sake of keeping our discussion inter-
esting. However, philosophically speaking, it may very well be the case that
finding a system of measurements contextual means that “the same” objects
in different contexts are not really the same.
Exp: Perhaps. But I find such philosophical formulations unsatisfactory. We
need a language rich enough to lead to interesting classifications and quan-
tifications of contextuality. The language of CbD is rich enough. Trivial
renaming of all objects into object-contexts is not.
Int: I agree. I think I understand the definition of contextuality in CbD.
However, I may need more persuasion to accept it. Let me return to my
misgivings about “contextuality-1” and “contextuality-2.” Why do we need
the latter?
Exp: Let me remind to you that “contextuality-1” is inconsistent connected-
ness: for some objects, their measurements have different distributions in
different contexts. We may very well have a consistently connected system,
however, without “contextuality-1.” Will we simply declare it noncontex-
tual since all contextuality is “contextuality-1”? Again, one can say this if
one so wishes, but this terminology will not change the fact that there is an
important distinction within the class of consistently connected systems of
measurements.
Int: Please remind me what this distinction is.
Exp: If the distribution of the measurements of a given object is the same
across all contexts involving this object, then it is possible to couple these
measurements so that their copies in the coupling are equal to each other
with probability 1. Let’s call this the identity coupling. Now, there are
two possibilities. There can be a consistently connected system that has
a coupling in which this probability 1 is achieved for all objects; in other
words the identity couplings for different objects can all be put together
so that they are compatible with the observed distributions of the bunches
of measurements in each of the contexts. And there can be systems in
which such couplings do not exist: the observed bunches of measurements
are not compatible with the identity couplings for all the objects. This is
an important distinction, and it is captured by calling the systems of the
latter kind contextual. In quantum physics this distinction is related to such
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questions as the (non)existence of hidden variables of which all observed
random variables in an experiment are functions.8
Int: Yes, I agree this distinction is important. But it seems to me in quantum
physics the case of consistent connectedness is the main if not the only
case to consider.9 If we retain the traditional definition of contextuality for
such systems (perhaps in the CbD formulation), do we need to extend it to
inconsistent connectedness? You said the contextuality in the sense of CbD
exists “on top of” inconsistent connectedness. Couldn’t we, however, simply
ignore it? In other words, couldn’t we have a single notion of contextuality,
which coincides with “contextuality-2” for consistently connected systems
and with “contextuality-1” otherwise? I have almost asked this question
before, but we digressed (or at least I see it now as a digression) into the
discussion of how one can define objects and contexts.
Exp: Let me think of how to respond to this, and we will return to this in our
next conversation.
Conversation 3
Exp: My dear Interlocutor, to defend a definition is a difficult task. A good def-
inition of a term should be intuitively plausible (although sometimes one’s
intuition itself should be “educated” to make it plausible), it should include
as special cases all examples and situations that are traditionally considered
to fall within the scope of the term, it should lead to productive develop-
ment (to allow one to prove nontrivial theorems), and have a growing set of
applications. I believe contextuality in the sense of CbD satisfies all these
desiderata, but I may be unable to discuss them with you comprehensively.
Int: Let us try intuitive plausibility.
Exp: One argument I find persuasive is appealing to “small” inconsistencies
added to consistently connected systems with “large” contextuality. Contex-
tuality in CbD can be rigorously quantified,10 but I will only need intuitive
guidance to present the argument. Consider our system
{(
RVA , R
V
B
)
,
(
RWA , R
W
B
)}
.
You may recall that the criterion (necessary and sufficient condition) for
noncontextuality here is given by the inequality
∣∣〈RVARVB〉− 〈RWA RWB 〉∣∣ ≤ ∣∣〈RVA〉− 〈RWA 〉∣∣+ ∣∣〈RVB〉− 〈RWB 〉∣∣ .
8Aut: This is, e.g., how the problem was formulated by Bell (1964). The possibility
of reformulating this in terms of the (non)existence of certain couplings (without using this
concept explicitly) was realized later, in Suppes and Zanotti (1981) and Fine (1982).
9Aut: It may be a prevalent case but definitely not the only one: see, e.g., Bacciagaluppi
(2015).
10Aut: See Dzhafarov et al. (2015a); Kujala et al. (2015); Kujala and Dzhafarov (2015);
de Barros et al. (2015).
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Your proposal is to accept this formula only for consistently connected sys-
tems, when ∣∣〈RVA〉− 〈RWA 〉∣∣+ ∣∣〈RVB〉− 〈RWB 〉∣∣ = 0.
In this case the system is contextual if and only if
∣∣〈RVARVB〉− 〈RWA RWB 〉∣∣ > 0.
Now, the largest possible value of the last expression is 2, and, I think you
would agree, it is reasonable to say that the system
{(
RVA , R
V
B
)
,
(
RWA , R
W
B
)}
with this value equal to 2 exhibits the greatest possible degree of contextu-
ality, given the consistent connectedness.
Int: Is this maximum value 2 compatible with consistent connectedness?
Exp: Yes, it is. See these two distributions:
RVB = +1 R
V
B = −1
RVA = +1
1
2 0
1
2
RVA = −1 0
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
RWB = +1 R
W
B = −1
RWA = +1 0
1
2
1
2
RWA = −1
1
2 0
1
2
1
2
1
2
The computations yield all the expected values
〈
RVA
〉
,
〈
RWA
〉
,
〈
RVB
〉
,
〈
RWB
〉
equal to zero,
〈
RVAR
V
B
〉
= 1 and
〈
RWA R
W
B
〉
= −1.
Int: I see. Please continue with your example.
Exp: Let us now introduce a minuscule inconsistency, say,
RVB = +1 R
V
B = −1
RVA = +1
1
2 ε
1
2 + ε
RVA = −1 0
1
2 − ε
1
2 − ε
1
2
1
2
RWB = +1 R
W
B = −1
RWA = +1 0
1
2
1
2
RWA = −1
1
2 0
1
2
1
2
1
2
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The only difference of this system from the previous one is that now〈
RVA
〉
= 2ε rather than 0 and
〈
RVAR
V
B
〉
= 1− 2ε rather than 1; but ε can be
chosen arbitrarily small. The system therefore can be made arbitrarily close
to the previous one. If I continue to follow your proposal, however, I should
abandon the joint expectations altogether and focus on the marginals only:
the system is contextual now simply because it is inconsistently connected,
∣∣〈RVA〉− 〈RWA 〉∣∣+ ∣∣〈RVB〉− 〈RWB 〉∣∣ = 2ε > 0.
But you would probably agree that if ε is minuscule, the degree of contex-
tuality in the system is minuscule too, wouldn’t you?
Int: Indeed I would. And I can guess the rest of your argument too. When
ε is very small but nonzero, the system has a small degree of contextuality
(which will be “contextuality-1”). As you make ε smaller and smaller, the
contextuality gets smaller and smaller. But as soon as ε reaches zero, the
contextuality jumps from the limiting zero value to the maximal possible
value (because now it is “contextuality-2”). It is a strange behavior, I should
admit.
Exp: Precisely. I conclude that your concept of contextuality is not well-formed.
If we distinguish inconsistent connectedness from contextuality in accor-
dance with CbD, however, the problem disappears. The degree of contex-
tuality in the second system, if ε is very small, is only slightly smaller than
the degree of contextuality in the first system. The inequality
2 =
∣∣〈RVARVB〉− 〈RWA RWB 〉∣∣ > ∣∣〈RVA〉− 〈RWA 〉∣∣+ ∣∣〈RVB〉− 〈RWB 〉∣∣ = 0
changes into
2− 2ε =
∣∣〈RVARVB〉− 〈RWA RWB 〉∣∣ > ∣∣〈RVA〉− 〈RWA 〉∣∣+ ∣∣〈RVB〉− 〈RWB 〉∣∣ = 2ε.
Int: I agree this feature speaks in favor of the CbD concept. Does this mean,
however, that inconsistent connectedness and contextuality (or “contextuality-
1” and “contextuality-2,” even if you don’t like this terminology) have fun-
damentally different ontologies?
Exp: It is a question to which I do not have a definitive answer. Inconsis-
tent connectedness in most, if not all cases have trivial and well-understood
causes: conditions under which measurements are made affect these mea-
surements, either through physical interference or through context-dependent
measurement biases. In the example with written and verbal questions, read-
ing a question invokes very different psychological processes than hearing it
asked: there is nothing remarkable in the distributions of responses in the
two cases being different. Or consider a formally identical but empirically
different example: replace the presentation mode with order in which the
two questions are asked, so that instead of V we have context A → B and
instead of W the context B → A. In this case it is natural to expect that
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the first question affects a person’s response to the second question.11 In
physics, it is common that different contexts correspond to different exper-
imental set-ups, so that one and the same object in different contexts is
simply measured differently.12
Int: And you claim that the causes for contextuality are different?
Exp: At least they may be different, and they are definitely different in some
cases. Take the famous Alice-Bob experiment (more formally known as the
EPR/Bohm or EPR/Bell paradigm), in which Alice measures spins in a
particle 1 and Bob measures spins in a particle 2. The two particles are
entangled, meaning that they were created in a special, singular state that
makes Alice’s and Bob’s spins that are measured in the opposite directions
perfectly correlated. Alice and Bob make their measurements simultane-
ously from some Charlie’s point of view, and this precludes any information
traveling from Alice to Bob or vice versa. Nevertheless, we have a clear
case of contextuality (“contextuality-2”) in this case.13 If we modify this
experiment so that Alice and Bob (from Charlie’s point of view) make their
measurement with an interval between them that allows for signaling, and if
we assume that some form of signaling is indeed effected, then we may have
distributions of Alice’s measurement depending on Bob’s settings and/or
vice versa. This would be inconsistent connectedness. But contextuality
may still be measurable “on top of” this inconsistency.14
Int: But you don’t know if contextuality is always so different in nature from
inconsistent connectedness, do you?
Exp: No, which is why I said I did not have a definitive answer.
Int: Do we know if contextuality of the kind we find in quantum physics also
exists in non-physical systems? Perhaps in human behavior?
Exp: No, we don’t. A recent analysis of available experimental data in psy-
chology seems to suggest that the answer is negative.15 But we can’t know
for sure, because in psychology we lack a theory analogous to quantum me-
chanics and have to grope in darkness trying now this and then that.
Int: So it is possible that contextuality only exists in quantum physics? This
would be disappointing, wouldn’t it?
Exp: Not necessarily. Lack of contextuality, if it can be formulated as a general
principle in some domain, allows us to predict outcomes of experiments, or at
least predict what outcomes are not possible. In psychology this hypothetical
principle would, in a sense, create a general theory that we otherwise lack.
11Aut: See Moore (2002); Wang et al. (2014); Dzhafarov et al. (2015c).
12 Aut: See the discussion of an experiment by Lapkiewicz et al. (2011) in Kujala et al.
(2015).
13Aut: See, e.g., Dzhafarov and Kujala (2014b).
14Aut: See the chapter by Kujala and Dzhafarov in this volume.
15Aut: See Dzhafarov et al. (2015c).
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Int: I see. Well, we have covered a lot of ground in our conversations. Would
you like to summarize?
Exp: I could summarize the definition of contextuality in a more formal way. I
recall you did not like informal presentations.
Int: Please do.
Exp: The primitive concepts of the theory are16
1. set Q of “objects being measured,”
2. set C of “contexts of measurements,”
3. relation “object q is measured in context c,” q  c, and
4. set of “measurements,” random variables R =
{
Rcq : q  c
}c∈C
q∈Q
.
Two postulates of the theory are
1. for a given context c ∈ C, the set of measurements Rc =
{
Rcq : q  c
}
q∈Q
is a random variable (which means the measurements are jointly dis-
tributed);
2. any two measurements Rcq, R
c′
q′ with c 6= c
′ are stochastically unrelated
(whether q = q′ or not).
We call the set Rq =
{
Rcq : q  c
}c∈C
a connection for object q. The el-
ements of a connection are pairwise stochastically unrelated. Let Tq ={
T cq : q  c
}c∈C
be a coupling for connection Rq, i.e., T
c
q has the same dis-
tribution as Rcq for all c such that q  c. This coupling is called maximal if
Pr
[
for any c, c′ ∈ C, T cq = T
c′
q
]
is maximal across all possible couplings for
Rq. Such a coupling exist, and the maximal probability in question, pq, is
uniquely defined.
Let S =
{
Scq : q  c
}c∈C
q∈Q
be a coupling for the systemR, i.e., Sc =
{
Scq : q  c
}
q∈Q
is distributed as Rc =
{
Rcq : q  c
}
q∈Q
for all q  c. This coupling is called
maximally connected if
Pr
[
for any c, c′ ∈ C, Scq = S
c′
q
]
= pq
for every q ∈ Q. If R has a maximally connected coupling it is noncontextual.
If R does not have a maximally connected coupling it is contextual.
Int: Do we know criteria of (non)contextuality analogous to the one you men-
tioned before, for the system
{(
RVA , R
V
B
)
,
(
RWA , R
W
B
)}
?
16Aut: For details see Dzhafarov et al. (2015a); Kujala et al. (2015); Kujala and Dzhafarov
(2015); de Barros et al. (2015).
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Exp: Yes, this was a special (in fact, simplest) example of a broad class of
systems for which we have criteria of (non)contextuality. These systems are
called cyclic, and they are defined as follows: for some n > 1,
1. the set of objects is Q = {q1, . . . , qn},
2. the set of contexts is C = {c1, . . . , cn},
3. for each object q there are precisely two contexts c, c′ such that q  c and
q  c′,
4. for each context c there are precisely two objects q, q′ such that q  c and
q′  c,
5. all Rcq with q  c are binary, ±1.
By appropriate enumeration we can always achieve a cyclic structure: qi  ci
and qi⊕1  ci for i = 1, . . . , n (where ⊕ is cyclic increment, with n⊕ 1 = 1).
The system is noncontextual if and only if
max
odd number
of minuses
n∑
i=1
(
±
〈
RiiR
i
i⊕1
〉)
≤ (n− 2) +
n∑
i=1
∣∣〈Rii⊕1〉− 〈Ri⊕1i⊕1〉∣∣ ,
where each ±
〈
RiiR
i
i⊕1
〉
is replaced with +
〈
RiiR
i
i⊕1
〉
or −
〈
RiiR
i
i⊕1
〉
so that
the minus is chosen an odd number of times (1, 3, . . .).
Int: This looks like a good point at which to adjourn, my dear Expositor. I
have to think this all over. I am sure I will come up with more questions
and misgivings.
Exp: I am sure you will, my dear Interlocutor. Until then, good bye.17
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